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Summary
The uN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights from 2011 stipulate that corpora-
tions must carry out human rights due diligence. 
One element of this obligation is to conduct a 
human rights risk and impact assessment in 
order to identify potential adverse effects of their 
business activities on human rights. Once human 
rights risks have been identified, business enter-
prises must seek to avoid them, reduce them or 
compensate those affected. 
Risk assessments are nothing new for business 
enterprises. However, their understanding of what 
constitutes “risk” is completely different: whereas 
a human rights risk assessment essentially aims 
to identify risks that pose a threat to people and 
their rights, corporate risk assessments are about 
identifying potentially adverse effects on returns 
on investments or operations. As a consequence, 
situations may arise in which according to the 
entrepreneur’s risk calculation, the correct course 
of action may be not to avoid a risk, even though it 
has been recognized. This analysis by the German 
Institute for Human Rights outlines the different 
concepts of risk in a human rights and in a busi-
ness context using a model taken from financial 
theory. The potential impact this discrepancy can 
have in practice is illustrated using the example of 
a corporate risk assessment in the Colombian coal 
sector. From this analysis the Institute derives cri-
teria for possible self-regulatory action on the part 
of state and business, which can make a human 
rights risk assessment a mandatory requirement 
for enterprises. Only if such human rights risk 
assessments are made mandatory for corpora-
tions can these bring about an improvement in the 
situation of affected rights-holders in line with the 
uN Guiding Principles.
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1 Introduction
At the opening of the Fifth uN Forum on Business 
and Human Rights in November 2016, the  former 
uN Special Representative on Business and 
Human Rights, Professor John Ruggie, stressed 
how business enterprises misinterpret the concept 
of risk when it comes to human rights: risks are 
defined as financial risks for companies rather 
than as having potentially adverse effects on 
people. 
The present analysis takes such an assessment as 
its starting point. It shows that the challenge is to 
make a genuine human rights risk assessment a 
corporate requirement – and not simply to arrive 
at a harmonized interpretation of the concept 
of risk in the sense of an “agreed language” or 
to sensitize business enterprises to the idea of 
assessing risks from a human rights point of view. 
Only if a human rights-based risk assessment is 
made mandatory for corporations can the situa-
tion of affected rights-holders improve.1 
To elucidate this position, we present in Chapter 2 
the concept of a human rights-based risk assess-
ment and in Chapter 3 the risk assessment model 
used by business enterprises based on a concept 
of risk rooted in financial theory. Chapter 4 uses 
the example of the export-relevant coal sector in 
Colombia to illustrate the difference between these 
two approaches. This case demonstrates how the 
highly theoretical concept of risk behaviour derived 
from financial theory provides a suitable reflection 
of business practice. Finally, the analysis applies 
this financial theory model to human rights in order 
to establish criteria for the design of state regu-
lation, which may also be useful for enterprises 
wishing to develop self-regulatory strategies to 
carry out human rights due diligence. 
1 See also Shift (2015), p. 11. According to Shift, while enterprise risk management is potentially suitable for embedding a human rights 
risk assessment, the enterprise must bear in mind that the risks to be measured are not corporate but stakeholder risks. 
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2 Human Rights Risk Assessment
A human rights-based risk and impact assessment 
is part of corporate human rights due diligence. 
What this means in practice is described in the 
second section of the united Nations Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights, “The Corpo-
rate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights”. 
The uN Guiding Principles were adopted unani-
mously by the Human Rights Council in 2011 and 
therefore enjoy a high degree of legitimacy. They 
introduce the concept of corporate human rights 
due diligence into the international system for 
the protection of human rights. In drawing up the 
Guiding Principles, the uN Secretary General’s 
Special Representative on Business and Human 
Rights attached great importance to including the 
positions of the various stakeholders. To this end, 
he conducted talks with business enterprises, civil 
society organizations and national human rights 
institutions all over the world. In this way he was 
able to develop an “agreed language” between the 
various interest groups. 
In particular the introduction of the concept of 
human rights due diligence represented a mile-
stone, since due diligence is relevant in both a 
human rights and a business context. Business 
enterprises are familiar with the concept with 
respect to company mergers or initial public 
offerings, for example, where they must evaluate 
the risks associated with such steps in advance.2 
Human rights experts initially regarded due dili-
gence as a benchmark by which to judge action by 
the state, in particular with respect to protecting 
women’s rights from violation by private actors.3 
In the uN Guiding Principles human rights actors 
and business enterprises have found a common 
concept with which to address corporate human 
rights risks and impacts. 
Since the adoption of the uN Guiding Principles, if 
not before, both business enterprises and human 
rights experts have been concerned with the 
question of how human rights due diligence can be 
translated into business practice. The uN Working 
Group on Business and Human Rights, which is 
charged with continuing the work of the Special 
Representative, has published a comprehensive 
handbook on this subject, which provides an inter-
pretation of human rights risks: 
“[…] an enterprise’s human rights risks are the 
risks that its operations pose to human rights. 
This is separate from any risks that involvement in 
human rights impact may pose to the enterprise, 
although the two are increasingly related.”4 
Human rights risks are thus understood as the 
potentially adverse effects of business activities 
on human rights. The impact on human rights is 
adverse if as a consequence of corporate activity 
either the state is hampered in its implementation 
of human rights or rights-holders can no longer 
fully exercise their rights. Potentially adverse 
effects are those that have not yet occurred at 
the point when the assessment was conducted, 
but that could occur as a result of a business 
operation. The subject of a human rights risk 
2 John Ruggie states: “[…] the concept of human rights due diligence brought the issue of identifying and addressing companies’ adverse 
human rights impacts into a familiar risk-based framing for them [businesses].” [see Ruggie (2013)]; see also, for example, Patrick Sinewe: 
“The party commissioning such an investigation is usually the potential buyer, since it is one of his fundamental obligations to check 
an object before purchasing it. Only in this way can he find out what risks and opportunities the company is concealing.” [see Sinewe 
(2010)]. 
3 Cf. Walling / Waltz (2011). 
4 uN, Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner (2012), p. 37. 
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assessment is always a specific human right, such 
as the “Right to Water”.5 One element of human 
rights due diligence is to conduct a risk assess-
ment that allows business enterprises to identify, 
to prevent and to remedy the adverse human 
rights effects of their actions or of their failure to 
act.6 
Not only the uN working group itself, but busi-
ness enterprises7 as well as many human rights 
organizations are working on the issue of risk and 
impact assessment and seeking ways to apply the 
uN Guiding Principles in business practice. Here 
they are particularly concerned with two ques-
tions: How can companies identify their risks and 
impacts? What can, should or must companies do 
to avoid risks and mitigate the impact they have 
already had? 
To find answers to these two questions, a risk 
assessment considers a planned business opera-
tion from a human rights point of view. It identifies 
potential human rights impacts that are either 
directly linked with business activity, directly 
caused by the enterprise or to which the enter-
prise contributes. “directly linked” means that 
the (potential) impact must be connected with the 
company’s business relations; the word “cause” is 
used in cases where the activities of an enterprise 
causally encroach on a specific human right; “con-
tribute” means that the adverse effect would not 
have occurred solely as a result of the enterprise’s 
activity but in combination with others has led to a 
situation where such an impact has occurred. An 
important point here is that these different types 
of relationships between business activity and 
impact on human rights cannot be strictly sepa-
rated but in practice merge into one another.8
The uN Guiding Principles require of human rights 
due diligence that enterprises should “avoid 
causing or contributing to adverse human rights 
impacts through their own activities […]” (uN Guid-
ing Principles 13a). The danish Institute for Human 
Rights proposes ten quality criteria relating to both 
the process and content of human rights impact 
assessments. In accordance with Guiding Prin-
ciple 13a, one of the criteria relating to content 
is that potential impacts on human rights should 
be addressed in line with the following hierarchy 
of action: avoid – reduce – restore – remediate.9 
One possible interpretation of human rights due 
diligence would therefore be that adverse effects 
should be reduced if it is not possible to avoid 
them entirely, but even in these instances the 
original state should be restored. If it is impossible 
to restore the original state, then those affected 
should be compensated. A compensation payment 
is not, however, a substitute for human rights 
due diligence, which must seek to avoid adverse 
effects on human rights.10 
The present analysis examines the business 
calculation of risk and seeks options for human 
rights requirements to be integrated into a risk 
assessment. For this reason, we will initially leave 
aside the role of the state, even though in line with 
its obligation to protect human rights the state has 
5 Ibid., Principle 11, commentary.
6 See uN, Human Rights Council (2011), Principle 17, commentary. 
7 Cf. for example deutsches Global Compact Netzwerk (2015).
8 See, in particular, Ruggie’s critique (2017) of the theses of debevoise & Plimpton (2017) in a letter to the OECd. The danish Institute for 
Human Rights categorizes cumulative effects fundamentally as “contributory” [see The danish Institute for Human Rights (2016a), p. 7]. 
We define “cumulative effects” slightly differently and believe it is possible that a cumulative effect can also be caused (or partly caused): 
for example, if there are two different sources of an adverse effect that would not occur if one of the sources were eliminated, then both 
sources are deemed to have caused the negative effect.
9 See danish Institute for Human Rights (2016b), p. 28. The danish Institute for Human Rights formulates processual quality criteria for an 
impact assessment: participation, accountability, non-discrimination, empowerment and transparency. It also formulates quality criteria 
relating to content: international human rights as a benchmark, scope of impacts, taking account of interactions between different human 
rights or between effects, assessing impact severity, considering the scope, scale and irremediability of particular impacts, taking into 
account the views of rights-holders, addressing all impacts, giving priority primarily to the severity of human rights consequences; address 
effects according to the following hierarchy: avoid-reduce-restore-remediate, ensure access to remedy; cf. deutsches Global Compact 
Netzwerk and German Institute for Human Rights (2015).
10 See uN Human Rights Council (2011), Principle 19, commentary; see also deutsches Global Compact Netzwerk and German Institute for 
Human Rights (2015), p. 15.
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the power to impose limitations on business enter-
prises and not to permit a project to go ahead if 
there is a risk of irreparable damage. Chapter 5 
formulates criteria that must be observed by 
the state and by business enterprises wishing to 
engage in self-regulation if human rights are to be 
integrated into business risk calculations. 
In the six years that have elapsed since the pub-
lication of the uN Guiding Principles, enterprises 
worldwide have taken steps towards carrying 
out human rights due diligence.11 Human rights 
experts have worked with these enterprises to 
meet the challenge of integrating human rights 
requirements into corporate practice. However, 
there is still major disagreement between busi-
ness and human rights experts about whether 
due diligence should become legally mandatory 
or whether it should be exercised on a voluntary 
basis.12 From a human rights point of view it is 
argued that voluntary measures are not suffi-
cient to ensure that enterprises exercise due 
diligence.13
Although business enterprises and human rights 
organizations have found a valuable common 
approach to the concept of due diligence, this has 
also led to more profound conceptual contradic-
tions becoming masked. The continuing controver-
sial discussion about mandatory versus voluntary 
human rights due diligence is an expression of 
such contradictions. 
In order to shed light on these contradictions, 
in the following the human rights understanding 
of risk assessment will be contrasted with the 
business concept of risk. We will then examine 
which criteria need to be fulfilled in order for the 
potentially adverse effects of business activities to 
appear on enterprises’ “risk radar”. 
11 Ibid, with five example cases from the following sectors: pharmaceuticals and chemicals, raw materials, tourism, automobiles and food.
12 France became the first European country to pass a law making human rights due diligence mandatory for enterprises [cf. Wesche 
(2017)].
13 Cf. klinger / krajewski / krebs / Hartmann (2016).
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3 Corporate Risk Assessment
Which risk concept enterprises follow can be 
described in two ways: with examples from busi-
ness practice or in terms derived from economic 
theory.14 The latter would seem most appropriate, 
because here we are interested in the contrast 
between the business and the human rights 
understanding of risk: a human rights concept of 
risk can be derived only from legal norms, and for 
this reason this analysis refers to the uN Guiding 
Principles. It follows then that the corporate defi-
nition of risk must also be defined in fundamental 
terms. This is why the analysis does not derive the 
corporate concept of risk from business practice – 
by conducting qualitative interviews for example – 
but instead relies on a general economic model 
taken from financial theory that seeks to explain 
the risk behaviour of enterprises. The theory in 
question is the modern Portfolio Theory developed 
by mathematical economist Harry markowitz. How 
economic decisions are made is one of the central 
questions of modern economics. The appeal of 
this high level of abstraction is precisely that 
economically expedient behaviour, irrespective 
of sector, needs to be understood in fundamen-
tal terms. In order to examine the conceptual 
compatibility of human rights requirements and 
economic decision-making, such an abstract 
approach would appear to be fruitful.15 After all, an 
inductive approach based on the activities of one 
or more enterprises would tell us only whether the 
behaviour of a specific enterprise complies with 
human rights requirements. The present analysis 
is not concerned with individual cases, however, 
but with the conceptual contradictions that both 
states and business enterprises need to recog-
nize and address in order for human rights to be 
factored into corporate calculations. 
This analysis of corporate risk behaviour is based 
not on economic models from environmental the-
ory or on theories of market failure from finance. 
Our aim is not to use an approach, which observes 
actors from outside in order to create a set of pol-
icy rules, but instead to deduce the social conse-
quences from the corporate calculation itself. Thus 
we do not, for example, use the theory of external-
ities – the central concept of neoclassical environ-
mental economics – even though for an analysis of 
adverse effects on human rights this might appear 
to be an obvious choice, just as it is for an anal-
ysis of environmental effects. Externalities exist, 
for example, if a factory pollutes a river and the 
14 For a definition of risk from business practice, with a particular focus on Enterprise Risk management, cf. Fasterling (2017), whose 
publication reached us only after the text of this analysis had been finalized. With respect to the discrepancy between corporate and 
human rights risk assessment, Fasterling comes to a similar conclusion as the present analysis: human rights due diligence as stipulated 
by the uNGP is scarcely compatible with the traditional management of “social risks”. The present analysis reaches this conclusion by 
considering the position of decision-makers from the perspective offered by theoretical models and derives from this the criteria that 
need to be fulfilled for business enterprises to take account of human rights risks. Fasterling notes in his conclusions that an approach 
to human rights as stipulated by the uNGP changes the purpose of the enterprise. Based on our application of modern Portfolio Theory 
to human rights, we do not believe that the enterprise’s aims can be so easily modified; however, one of the conclusions reached by the 
present analysis is that the conceptual conflict between a human rights and a business risk confronts the purpose of the enterprise with 
two mutually exclusive aims. The question of whether this contradiction can be eliminated via change – including a change in the social 
significance of enterprises – would require further research.
15 However, one must distinguish here between two different levels of “normative analysis”: human rights normative analysis (section 2) 
derives its conclusions from legal norms (including soft law). Economic normative analysis bases its evaluation on fundamental math-
ematical assumptions. In human rights logic “must” refers to a legal requirement: for example, in accordance with the ILO’s key labour 
standards, an enterprise must allow a worker to take breaks if he or she works more than a certain number of hours, otherwise it violates 
binding legal regulations. According to business logic, “must” refers to assumptions about an actor’s rationality: if the production costs of 
an additional unit of a given product are below the average costs, the enterprise raise the production volume, otherwise it will not maxi-
mize its return.
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fishermen’s earnings are reduced either because 
the fish die or because the catch is of poorer qual-
ity. Here the factory has a negative external effect 
on the fish production. The causal link is obvi-
ous and the fishermen’s losses can be precisely 
calculated. In such a case the externalities can be 
“internalized” if, say, the enterprise that operates 
the factory has to pay a tax to the state (Pigovian 
tax). Another option would be, in line with the 
Coase theorem, for the fishermen to appeal to the 
enterprise and for both parties to look for a joint 
solution to the problem. Sectoral initiatives like the 
German Textiles Partnership, are ultimately based 
on such Coase negotiations. 
How the theories of market failure and the solu-
tions they offer both in theory and in practice, 
especially in the environmental sphere, might also 
be applied to human rights is a central question 
that should be more broadly addressed in the field 
of business and human rights, for the central pre-
requisites posited by these theories often do not 
exist in a human rights context: 
– One of these prerequisites is the ability to put 
a price on human rights effects, which cannot 
be fulfilled ad hoc. The losses suffered by the 
fishermen in the example above, on the other 
hand, can be measured in monetary terms; 
indeed, only for this reason can the level of the 
Pigovian tax be determined, and only for this 
reason can enterprises’ externalities be inter-
nalized. But in the case of human rights effects, 
this prerequisite often does not exist. If, for 
example, the use of mercury in gold mining 
poisons a region’s drinking water and causes 
children to suffer cognitive damage, then this 
constitutes a violation of their Right to Health 
(Art. 12.1, Social Covenant). Furthermore, 
many other rights are indirectly violated, such 
as the Right to Education if the state does not 
respond to this cognitive impairment by estab-
lishing inclusive schools. The violation of the 
Right to Health cannot, however, be expressed 
in monetary terms.
– The second prerequisite, namely, the ability to 
establish a precise causal relationship between 
an enterprise’s activities and the impact on 
human rights, likewise often does not exist, 
especially in cases where an enterprise contrib-
utes to an adverse effect but has not caused it 
itself.
In Chapter 5, the present analysis touches on an 
environmental economics approach in order to 
derive criteria for the regulation or self-regulation 
of corporate risk behaviour. However, its central 
focus is the difference in what a risk arising from 
corporate decision-making means in a human 
rights and in a business context. In our methodol-
ogy we therefore use a business-based approach 
from the sphere of finance which seeks to simu-
late the perspective of the enterprise in a theoret-
ical model. 
Let us start by developing a model with a general 
corporate definition of risk. Risk in a business 
context means potentially adverse effects on the 
return the enterprise can expect to gain from 
an investment or from a business operation.16 
In order to understand the business consider-
ations behind such an assessment, financial 
theory defines17 decisions taken under conditions 
of uncertainty as “lotteries”: a lottery links the 
possible result of a particular course of action 
with the probability that this result will occur.18 In 
other words, there are various courses of action 
each of which will lead to different returns. Since, 
however, it is not possible to determine in advance 
which course of action will yield which return, var-
ious possible returns together with the probability 
16 Cf. for example Raps (2015): “Risk describes the asset-reducing uncertain events that result from a development that is less favourable 
than planned (danger of loss or damage.” Or Artur Woll’s dictionary of economics (1991, p. 627): “A danger of loss or chance of profit 
associated with an (economic) act.” Woll also mentioned the distinction between risk and uncertainty identified by Frank H. knight, 
namely, that in the case of the former the probability distribution is known. Another point of interest in Woll’s work is the neutrality of the 
definition, which sees an equal relationship between risk and profit and risk and loss: a risk of loss or chance of profit.
17 Here the analysis refers primarily to kruschwitz (2004).
18 A lottery is defined as follows: Ai = [xi1, ... , xis: q1, ... , qs] ; where A = possible course of action, x = result of the action, q = probability of 
the result’s occurrence.
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that they will occur are attributed to each of the 
possible courses of action. The ultimate decision 
always favours the lottery for which the expected 
benefit to the decision-maker is greatest.19 
How the decision-maker deals with the risk that 
the return may not materialize or may be lower 
than expected depends on the intensity of the 
decision-maker’s attitude to risk. Financial theory 
measures the intensity of risk aversion in terms 
of a so-called risk premium. The risk premium 
is a subjective discount from the enterprise’s 
expected assets in cases of uncertain future 
payments – it may be understood as a kind of 
insurance premium that the enterprise is pre-
pared to pay in order to insure itself against the 
risk.20 The more risk-averse a decision-maker 
is, the higher the risk premium. The economist 
Harry markowitz, who received the Nobel Prize 
for his modern Portfolio Theory in 1990,21 defines 
the risk premium as the difference between the 
expected final return and the certainty equivalent. 
The certainty equivalent denotes the (hypotheti-
cal) payment that the decision-maker would have 
to receive in order to maintain the same level of 
monetary value without the lottery as he would 
have done if he had achieved it. For the enterprise 
the certainty equivalent corresponds with the sum 
that it would have to receive in order to make up 
for its investment.22
If we consider differing degrees of risk aversion, 
we see that an enterprise does not necessarily 
have to choose the course of action with the 
smallest risk.23 Rather the risk-averse deci-
sion-maker faces a so-called optimization prob-
lem: he can maximize his utility from courses of 
action with uncertain outcomes depending on his 
attitude to risk, the probability that the various 
possible returns will materialize and the expected 
return. The decision-maker will permit precisely 
the risk that brings him the maximum return.24 
Human rights-associated risks for enterprises 
may include such things as reparation payments, 
court and bureaucracy costs or damage to 
company reputation. A business operation that 
may have potentially adverse effects on human 
rights and may thus entail costs can therefore be 
defined as participation in a lottery with various 
possible outcomes. One possible outcome is 
that the enterprise will incur no costs because 
those affected do not defend themselves. This 
might be either because their access to justice is 
restricted or because, contrary to expectations, 
they do not suffer adverse effects after all. For 
the enterprise this would be the best possible 
outcome, because it would achieve a maximum 
19 According to the expected value principle, under certain conditions the maximum utility will concur with the highest expected value of a 
lottery [see kruschwitz (2004), p. 123].
20 E[U(W + x)] = U(W + E[x] – π), whereby E = expectation, u = utility, W = secure returns, x = lottery outcome, π = risk premium [cf. krus-
chwitz (2010)]. 
21 Cf. markowitz (1990).
22 Since the utility function u as an independent variable x determines the lottery outcome, it is plausible to understand the certainty 
equivalent as the inverse of the utility function: U–1(E [U(W + x)]. The risk premium can be calculated as π = W + E[x] – U–1(E [U(W + x)]). 
[cf. kruschwitz (2004)].
23 Financial theory draws a distinction not only between different degrees of risk aversion, but also between risk types: risk-averse, risk-neu-
tral and risk-loving decision-makers. The risk-neutral decision-maker is indifferent to risk. In other words, he or she does not expect a 
reduction in expected return, and the risk premium is therefore eliminated. In the case of the risk-loving decision-maker, the risk premium 
is negative; not only does he not expect a reduction in the expected return but rather a bonus, since for him the risk brings an additional 
benefit and he is prepared to pay a higher price for it. For the present analysis the risk-loving decision-maker is not relevant, since a sce-
nario where an entrepreneur loves risks so much that he is prepared to pay an additional price for this is far from business reality. Here it 
is sufficient to work with the risk intensity of the risk-averse decision-maker. He may have a very low risk aversion, so that he is virtually 
indifferent to the risks associated with a business operation, in other words, the risk premium may be almost zero or else very high, so 
that even a small risk is sufficient for him to decide not to proceed with the operation.
24 It may be assumed that the maximum utility equals the maximum return, which for the business context is a justified assumption, espe-
cially since the maximization problem can be formulated under secondary conditions which we will not go into further here. The financial 
theory also derives the attitude to risk from the individual utility but does so in a generalizing way so that the results apply not only to 
private households but more generally as well. In addition, in line with the π–σ-principle, the expected utility depends exclusively on the 
expectation value and the variance in the return on an investment. Insofar as the possible returns are normally distributed, this applies to 
every utility function [see kruschwitz (2004), p.130].
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return on its investment. Another result might 
be that the enterprise achieves a return but has 
to deduct compensation costs. As long as the 
return exceeds the compensation payments, the 
outcome will remain positive. A third possibility 
is that fines will need to be deducted from the 
return, and a fourth, that the enterprise achieves 
a smaller return because of the damage to its rep-
utation, which has a negative impact on demand.25 
The price of the lottery can be calculated as the 
expected value of the outcome minus the risk pre-
mium. Since the expected value is determined by 
the sum of the factors, probability of occurrence 
and outcome, anticipated fines, compensation 
payments or reputation costs will not necessarily 
mean that the enterprise will decide against the 
planned operation.26 Even if the payments exceed 
the expected return, i. e. the possible return is 
negative, the investment can still be rational in 
business terms, since the enterprise’s decision 
depends on the probability of occurrence and the 
level of the expected negative and other returns 
as well as the risk premium. If the probability of a 
return is very high or – with an equal probability 
of a loss occurring – the expected return is very 
high, then the enterprise will take the risk, unless 
of course the decision-maker is so risk-averse27 
that he demands a risk premium, which makes 
him unable to act.28 modern Portfolio Theory 
assumes that an “efficient frontier” exists among 
the possible portfolios between which an investor 
can choose and in which, given certain assump-
tions, the expected returns increase as the risk 
becomes higher. If a portfolio is composed of both 
secure and risky securities, then the relationship 
even becomes linear. The further development of 
modern Portfolio Theory, the Capital Asset Pricing 
model, which departs from the perspective of 
the investor to look at the situation from a more 
generalized point of view, concludes that there 
is a positive correlation between market risk and 
level of return.29 
In the next section we translate the theoretical 
insights we have gained here into practice by 
means of a case example. The different effects 
of business and human rights concepts of risk 
can be illustrated using the example of a planned 
diversion of the Rio Bruno for a mining project in 
Colombia. We note here that markowitz developed 
his modern Portfolio Theory with respect to finan-
cial securities and was explicitly not interested 
in manufacturing but rather in the decisions of 
financial investors. Nevertheless, he couched the 
problem, which was partly based on micro-eco-
nomic utility theory, in such general terms that it 
became abstract and independent of the content 
of the decision-making criteria. 
25 Ai = [x01, xE1, xS1, xR1:〖q0, qE , qS , qR ] with x01 = no-risk return; xE1 = return after compensation payments; xS1 = return after paying fines; 
xR1 = reduced return because of damage to reputation; qE,S,R = the respective probabilities of an outcome occurring; I = the chosen course of action 
or business operation.
26 E[~x ] – π ; with E[~x ] = ∑Ss = 1 xs qs. 
27 Fundamentally one must assume that decision-makers in an enterprise are risk-averse, but to assume an extremely high level of risk 
aversion would be unrealistic. Otherwise an enterprise would always choose a risk-free savings interest and strongly reduce its operations 
or cease operating altogether.
28 For example: if we take the lottery from footnote 25 and insert numbers by way of illustration. With x01 = 15: no-risk return; xE1 = –5: return 
after compensation payments; xs1 = 8: return after paying fines; xR1 = 6: reduced return because of damage to reputation; q0 = 0,6: the probability 
of a return without compensation payments, fines or reputation costs is relatively high depending on the context, in this example it is relatively 
moderate at 60 percent; qE = 0,1: the probability that the enterprise will have to make high compensation payments is assumed here to be 10 per-
cent; qs = 0,2: the probability, that it will have to pay a fine is assumed to be 20 percent; qR = 0,1: the probability of damage to its reputation. 
A = [15, –5, 8, 6: 0.6, 0.1, 0.2, 0.1]. The expected value of the lottery outcome is then: E[~x ]= ∑Ss = 1 xs qs = 11,7. different decisions for the 
respective risk types follow from this. A risk-neutral decision-maker (π = 0) must make the investment if he wishes to maximize the enter-
prise’s return, otherwise he gambles away 11.7 monetary units. Incidentally, this still applies even though the compensation payment here 
is rather high, namely, 20 monetary units and if it occurs it would mean a loss for the enterprise of 5 monetary units. If the decision-maker 
is risk-averse, then the decision depends on how intense his risk-aversion is – i. e., the level of the risk premium. A risk-averse deci-
sion-maker could have a utility function U(x) = √x, since the second order condition is negative – a condition for those who strictly shy off 
risks [cf. kruschwitz (2004), Table 3.9, p. 109]. The expected utility is then: E[U(x)] = √15 × 0,6 – √5 × 0,1 + √8 × 0,2 + √6 × 0,1 ≈ 2,91. 
The certainly equivalent must obtain the identical level of utility: U(SA) = √SA ≈ 2,91, from this it follows that the certainty equivalent is 
2,912 ≈ 8,47. The decision-maker would hence decide against this lottery, if he were offered a price for it of at least 8.47 (assuming that 
no additional risk-free income is associated with the operation).
29 See kruschwitz (2004), p. 220.
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4 The Case of Rio Bruno
The contradiction between the human rights and 
business concepts of risk may be illustrated by 
a specific case example in which stretches of a 
river in Colombia were to be diverted for a mining 
project. We first give some brief background infor-
mation about the company that sought to have 
the river diverted and the region through which 
the river flows. We then describe the company’s 
approach to the risks associated with the diver-
sion. The company’s course of action is explained 
in terms of financial theory in order then to fit-
tingly contrast the human rights requirements with 
the company’s human rights due diligence.
Cerrejón mining company is the largest coal-min-
ing company in Latin America and the tenth 
largest in the world. It mines coal for export, and 
importers include companies from the European 
energy sector such as E.ON and Vattenfall.30 BHP 
Billiton, Anglo American und Glencore each own 
a third of the company.31 In large-scale open-cast 
mining, the company first removes the overlying 
rock and then opens a pit into the earth, which it 
closes again once the coal has been extracted. 
Then the next pit is opened. The process can be 
repeated until all the coal reserves in the mine 
have been exhausted. This procedure means that 
over the years spent working in the region the 
company opens and then closes many different 
pits and the local community32 affected is a differ-
ent one each time.
The Cerrejón mine is located in the province of 
La Guajira, a drought-affected region in which 
restricted access to water and poor water quality 
present a special threat.33 Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous communities complain of great pov-
erty, poor infrastructure and – especially in La 
Guajira – of poor access to clean drinking water. 
The risk is particularly high for children, and the 
child mortality rate is rising among La Guajira’s 
indigenous population. According to the united 
Nations development Programme, water and food 
shortages have led to a humanitarian crisis in 
the region. The aid organization misereor esti-
mates that more than 4,700 children have died in 
the last eight years owing to drought and water 
shortages. The Wayuu indigenous group is par-
ticularly affected by the drought, which misereor 
believes is aggravated by extensive coal mining.34 
The Inter-American Human Rights Commission 
concurs with this view. In 2015, it demanded that 
the Colombian government take measures to 
protect Wayuu children and youths suffering from 
malnutrition.35
Cerrejón would now like to divert the Bruno River in 
La Guajira in order to expand its mining activities.36 
30 Cf. mining-technology.com (2013).
31 See Centro Regional de Empresas y Emprendimientos Responsables (2016), p. 36.
32 Often Afro-Colombian or indigenous communities.
33 Both the local communities in Cesar, who are still to be resettled, and those in La Guajira, who have already been resettled, complain of 
poor water quality and in some instances of contaminated soil. They also report damage to their health and poor availability of and access 
to medical care, making it necessary to leave the areas over which the enterprise has influence in order to receive treatment. The commu-
nities attribute their illnesses to the mining activities and accuse the company of making access to medical care more difficult by prevent-
ing doctors from treating members of the affected communities within its area of influence. Irrespective of whether these accusations are 
founded, these statements show a high level of mistrust between the local communities and the company. This was shown by a qualitative 
study conducted by the German Institute for Human Rights (cf. “Protokoll der Fokusgruppengespräche mit Gemeinschaften in Cesar”; cf. 
“Protokoll der Fokusgruppengespräche mit Gemeinschaften in La Guajira”). 
34 Cf. misereor (2016).
35  See People’s World (2017); see also Resolution 60/2015 of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission [Comision Interamericana de 
derechos (2015): Resolution 60/2015]. 
36  Cf. Alarcón (2016).
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The river acts as a “sponge”, storing water during 
the rainy season and releasing it again during the 
dry season, meaning in the dry season it not only 
supplies the nearby communities with water but 
also influences the ground water level in areas 
much further away. When asked by the Colombian 
National Human Rights Institution (defensoría del 
Pueblo), Cerrejón confirmed in an interview in may 
2016 that the reservoir function of the river would 
disappear and therefore access to water would 
deteriorate for many communities.37 In August 
2016, some local communities started a petition 
against the diversion of the river and in the mean-
time have collected almost 39.000 signatures.38 
The enterprise declared that it was aware of the 
impact the river’s diversion would have on the 
Right to Water but that it still intended to go ahead 
with the project as it would be able to deal with the 
impact “adequately”.39 
Here we see clearly the differences between 
business and human rights reasoning when it 
comes to dealing with risk: the enterprise simply 
factors in the adverse human rights consequences 
of its operation. Resulting costs for the enterprise 
as a result of this impact, such as compensation 
payments, are part of the “lottery” identified by 
modern Portfolio Theory (see above). The enter-
prise is prepared to leapfrog the “avoidance level” 
and proceed directly to the “mitigation level”. This 
corresponds with an argument from financial the-
ory which states that a risk must not be avoided 
per se, but rather should reflect the attitude to risk 
of the decision-maker who can factor a discount 
from the expected return into the equation. 
From a human rights points of view (see section 2 
on human rights due diligence), on the other 
hand, negative effects on human rights should be 
avoided. Only in instances where this is impossible 
must the enterprise use its leverage to reduce the 
effects. If it does not entirely succeed, then the 
enterprise must try to restore the previous state of 
affairs for those affected. In the human rights con-
cept of risk, the risk attitude of the decision-maker 
is irrelevant. The potential threat to those affected 
is already a criterion for choosing a particular 
course of action,40 and the company’s attitude to 
risks depends on their “severity” as well as the 
enterprise’s ability to exert leverage.41 According 
to a business-rationality, as described in financial 
theory terms (explained in Chapter 3), the com-
pany would only remain at the avoidance level (not 
diverting the river) if doing so yielded maximum 
utility even while taking into account the risks 
involved. That might be the case under a variety of 
circumstances: 
– The company could receive a certainty equiva-
lent, which would entail the state buying back 
its mining license for the river region. The price 
would have to be the same or higher than the 
certainty equivalent, in other words, a sum 
that would put the enterprise in just as good a 
position without conducting its operation as if 
it had carried out the operation and received 
the expected return minus risk costs. 
– The enterprise would remain on the avoidance 
level if the expected utility were to diminish, 
in other words, if the human rights impact 
resulted in very high financial costs, so that the 
enterprise would calculate a much higher risk 
premium and therefore decide against the oper-
ation. This monetarization of the human rights 
risk is achieved via an enhancement of the 
probability of a sanction being imposed in the 
event that damage is done. Cerrejón’s decision 
37  For a technical explanation of Cerrejón’s planned river diversion cf. universidad de La Guajira (n.y); cf. also the minutes of the interview 
with Cerrejón in La Guajira. 
38  Cf. Change.org (2017); cf. also Forum Syd (2016), pp. 19–22.
39  Cf. Protocol of the interview with Cerrejón in La Guajira.
40 The business approach to risk also contradicts that of environmental law. The “precautionary principle”, a central component of German 
and European environmental policy, requires the avoidance of environmental damage and goes beyond existing risks to include anticipa-
tion of possible future developments. The declaration of the uN Conference on Environment and development (uNCEd) of 1992 already 
describes the precautionary principle in Agenda 21 as taking measures to prevent concrete effects even if it is uncertain that these 
effects will occur, meaning environmental risks must be taken seriously even if there is a lack of scientific evidence; cf. Technische univer-
sität Berlin (2009).
41 Cf. The danish Institute for Human Rights (2016a).
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not to step back from the project despite being 
aware of the human rights risk confirms that 
risk is understood differently in a business con-
text than in a human rights context. 
The state, however, has the option of not approv-
ing a project if it is associated with irremediable 
risks. If, for example, it is known that the riv-
er’s ability to absorb water will be irreparably 
destroyed if it is diverted and that this will have 
consequences for the rights-holders who are 
dependent on the river, then it is the state’s 
responsibility to prevent the damage. Even if the 
enterprise guarantees that it will compensate 
inhabitants for the water shortage and thus deal 
with the violation of the Right to Water, the state’s 
obligation to protect demands that it should 
ensure that the Right to Water is protected in the 
long-term for later generations. What will happen 
in twenty-five years when the mine is closed? 
What will happen in fifty years?42 Risks can also 
change in the course of a project. Those which 
were deemed to be mitigatable at the beginning 
of the project may become aggravated and imply 
potentially irreparable damage. Thus both the 
state and enterprises as well as human rights 
experts must understand how human rights risks 
can be translated into business calculations in 
a way that enables the enterprise to avoid doing 
irreparable damage. 
42 See uN, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002): “General Comment No.15.”, section II, clause 11.
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5 Conclusion: Criteria for Integrating Human 
Rights Risks into Business Calculations
From modern Portfolio Theory, which we pre-
sented in Chapter 3, criteria can be derived which 
the state must fulfil in order to make human rights 
relevant for corporate risk assessments. differ-
ing concepts of risk and the differing interests 
of enterprises, human rights organizations and 
local communities have led to a divergent human 
rights practice. These differing concepts cannot be 
harmonized simply by arriving at an “agreed lan-
guage”, as the uN Guiding Principles, for instance, 
offer to various stakeholders, in particular states, 
civil society and enterprises. This is because busi-
nesses’ introducing human rights policies does 
not automatically result in improvements for those 
affected. Some enterprises have already come a 
long way in using and implementing “human rights 
language”, especially the uN Guiding Principles. 
They formulate fundamental obligations, know 
their risks and communicate them. This lends their 
activities legitimacy43 but does not in itself change 
the impact on affected parties. Cerrejón, for 
example, has issued a human rights policy com-
mittment focusing on the uN Guiding Principles; it 
knows what the potential human rights impact of 
its activities are and communicates these to the 
public.
Linguistic harmonization of the two concepts is 
simply not sufficient. Rather the corporate sector’s 
intention is to capture the potential impact on 
human rights from the point of view of a corporate 
risk calculation: in order to take effective account 
of business logic in dealing with human rights, the 
state – or the enterprise – must translate human 
rights risks into business risks. Current develop-
ments in the direction of more state regulation are 
primarily aimed at integrating human rights due 
diligence into business processes by introducing 
mandatory reporting.
more effective human rights due diligence requires 
a profound paradigm shift that would make human 
rights risk assessments a necessity for enter-
prises. For example, the state could introduce 
sanctions44 that create a negative incentive for 
behaviour that leapfrogs the “avoidance level” and 
starts from the “mitigation level”. The concept of 
a sanction as used here could also be conceived 
as self-regulatory sanctioning of an enterprise. 
After all, the aim of the present analysis is not to 
propose state measures but to try to understand 
under what conditions a business risk calcula-
tion will result in the implementation of human 
rights due diligence. The sanctions45 would need 
to satisfy particular criteria so that human rights 
risks are included in corporate risk calculation in 
such a way that an enterprise tries to avoid such 
risks. If complete avoidance were unnecessary 
and instead, as in the case of social and environ-
mental effects, a certain threshold would have to 
be reached, then the calculation would be differ-
ent. But a trade-off is not possible with respect to 
43 Cf. morrison (2014), who describes this as “the social licence”. 
44 The term “sanctions” should be understood broadly and includes more than simply the payment of fines. A possible approach might also 
be indirect sanctions that offer positive incentives in the form of tax breaks. 
45 A preventive regulation could set fees for enterprises that exceed the certainty equivalent. The enterprise would thus avoid engaging in 
an operation involving human rights risks. For the moment, however, this possible course of action must remain a theoretical scenario, 
because from a human rights point of view it is not permissible for an enterprise to be able to buy itself out of human rights obligations 
simply by paying a fee. For the design of a Pigovian tax, i.e., a tax intended to internalize external effects, the certainty equivalent could be 
used. The theoretical challenge is to forge a link between a general tax and a subjective order or preference, which reflects the certainty 
equivalent as an inversion of the utility function.
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human rights, and there is therefore no threshold 
value for adverse human rights effects that would 
vary depending on their severity and irreparability. 
This should not be confused with other kinds of 
interference in individual rights: a resettlement, 
for example, does not per se constitute a violation 
of human rights and can be planned in a way that 
conforms with them. Similarly, a river diversion 
does not necessarily have adverse effects that 
cannot be compensated for. The following deduc-
tions assume violations of human rights that are 
so severe and so irreparable that they must be 
avoided. If cases are assumed in which the risk 
need not be avoided but where it is sufficient to 
deal with the risk in an appropriate fashion, this 
does not alter the fundamental insights obtained 
by this analysis from financial theory; the calcu-
lation of the level and certainty of sanctions is, 
however, then less rigid.
The criteria can be derived from the structure of 
the lottery as described in Chapter 3 and in the 
case example given in Chapter 4: the enterprise 
is faced with various courses of action and will 
choose the alternative which promises the biggest 
return. In line with modern Portfolio Theory the 
expected return depends on three factors: the 
probability of occurrence of the various lottery 
outcomes, the level of the outcome and the 
decision-maker’s attitude to risk. Any regulation, 
whether by the state or from within the enterprise, 
must then influence at least one of these factors. 
It must be possible to formulate human rights risks 
in financial terms if they are to be factored into 
an enterprise’s risk calculation. For this purpose 
there are primarily three variables: the expected 
value of the lottery outcome, the probability of 
it occurring and the risk premium that the deci-
sion-maker demands for a risky undertaking. From 
this there follow three possibilities for influencing 
the enterprise’s risk calculation: 
1  Influencing the lottery results: probability of 
sanctions 
A possible sanction adds a further lottery out-
come to the enterprise’s lottery: under certain 
conditions the company must pay a fine if it 
causes damage. The level of this fine must be 
such that, according to the probability of the 
sanction occurring, the lottery is shifted to a 
point where it exceeds the expected return 
minus the risk premium. If the level of the risk 
premium is unknown but a low risk intensity is 
assumed, the level of the fine should be equiva-
lent to the expected return (from the operation 
in question).46 If the risk is to be avoided entirely, 
the sanction must be so high that the expected 
value of the outcome is less or equal to zero. 
According to this scenario, the state would have 
given permission for the project to go ahead but 
would nonetheless ensure that the enterprise 
only went through with it if it were certain that 
human rights would not be violated.
2  Influencing the probability of occurrence: 
sanction certainty 
The probability that a fine will have to be paid 
must be high – at least high enough that in 
calculating the expected value, the lottery result 
that involves paying a fine receives a greater 
weighting (we should remember here that the 
expected value of the lottery is the sum of the 
factors probability of occurrence and result). It 
is conceivable that payment of a fine is stipu-
lated but that the probability of occurrence is 
low: for example, the diversion of the river in 
the example given in Chapter 4 might lead to 
a water shortage only in an area far away, so 
that it would be difficult or impossible to prove 
46 Cf. footnotes 21 to 23. Since we can assume that π ≥ 0, a state sanction S must be at least as high as the expected value of the lottery 
outcome minus the risk premium: S ≥ E [~x ] – π. If we assume that the decision-maker’s risk-aversion is minimal, in other words, that he 
demands only a very small risk premium or none at all, the fine to be paid must be approximately equivalent to the level of the expected 
return. The modern Portfolio Theory argument is based on a utility which is at a higher level of abstraction than enterprise returns. In 
Chapter 2 we saw that under certain conditions we can assume that the maximum utility coincides with the maximum return. Here 
it is important to remember that the observations made in this analysis are restricted to actors in the private sector. It would also be 
conceivable to apply them to the activities of the state, which in carrying out an infrastructure project, for example, is not aiming to obtain 
a return; in this case the utility might even deviate from the return. Nor does this analysis assume that human rights risks undertaken by 
private actors must be exclusively associated with business operations aimed at realizing a return, for it simply notes that the link between 
risk and return, as it can be described using modern Portfolio Theory, also applies to human rights risks.
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that the enterprise bears responsibility. In this 
case it is highly likely that the enterprise would 
not have to pay a fine. If, however, the proba-
bility of having to pay a fine is very low, then 
even a potentially very high fine does not carry 
enough weight in the business calculation of the 
expectancy value of the results. In this respect, 
the certainty and level of sanctions cannot be 
considered completely separately. If the proba-
bility of having to pay a fine is zero, then a fine 
can be as high as one likes, but it still will not 
influence an enterprise’s decision.
3  Influencing risk intensity: state risk premium 
The risk premium is subjective and thus the 
state has little leverage in this instance.47 
Nevertheless, it would be conceivable to leave 
the structure of the lottery itself untouched 
and instead to tax the enterprise’s expected 
return with a kind of “state risk premium”. This 
would represent a sanction whose probability of 
occurrence is 100 percent, or, in other words, 
certain. In conceptual terms, then, “the state 
risk premium” would thus be roughly equiva-
lent to, say, the Pigouvian tax of environmental 
economics, with the difference that here the 
goal is not to return the damage that an enter-
prise has caused to third parties (external costs) 
back into the enterprise. In cases of irreparable 
damage, this is simply not possible. So this 
would not be a case of internalizing external 
costs but of a mechanism that would lead to 
avoidance – the basis for measurement cannot 
then be the damage caused alone, rather the 
“state risk premium” must orient itself towards 
the expected return. The expected return is then 
calculated from the expected value of the lottery 
results minus the subjective risk premium 
and minus the state risk premium. If the state 
risk premium is high enough – with a very low 
subjective risk premium roughly as high as the 
expected return – then the enterprise will not 
carry out the operation.48 This third possibility 
of influencing the enterprise’s calculation of 
risk does not make sense at first: for the state 
could just as well decide simply not to approve 
the project, i.e., in the case described in Chap-
ter 4, not to approve the diversion of the river. 
However, it is conceivable that the “state risk 
premium” will change in the course of the proj-
ect: the state could grant the license because 
studies have initially shown that the risk of 
endangering human rights is low and that com-
pensation is certainly possible. Then the state 
would demand a low “state risk premium” and 
announce that the “state risk premium” would 
grow in line with a growing risk. For example, 
the sponge function of the river might have been 
overlooked at the start of the project. In a later 
phase of the project, when this issue becomes 
apparent and the function cannot be replaced, 
the “state risk premium” could be raised until it 
exceeds the enterprise’s expected return.
All three leverage factors, all of which would 
have to take account of state regulations, can 
also be steered in a self-regulatory fashion by 
individual enterprises or sectoral initiatives: the 
level of sanctions, the probability of occurrence 
and the risk intensity. A precise portrayal of the 
possibilities of such an internal regulation of the 
human rights risk by an enterprise can be derived 
from markowitz’s modern Portfolio Theory taking 
account of the uN Guiding Principles, but this 
would exceed the framework of this analysis: for 
each leverage factor a more thorough analysis 
which takes into consideration the sector and the 
type of enterprise would be necessary. In conclu-
sion, we would briefly like to formulate a few ideas 
on this point: for example, the enterprise could 
make an insurance payment equivalent to the level 
of the expected lottery outcome minus the risk 
premium to an escrow account and in the case 
of damage forfeit this sum. If it is forced to make 
such a high insurance payment, then the enter-
prise would refrain from making the investment 
47 Without a doubt, measures to sensitize businesses to human rights requirements in risk assessment can however contribute to influenc-
ing the subjective level. 
48 The state risk premium can be conceived as a tax or as a certain sanction. A certain sanction would not mean a further possible result x 
of the lottery with the probability q, but rather a kind of second risk premium, in this instance a state issued one: utility without sanc-
tion U(W0 + E [~x ] – π) should be changed into a utility function with sanction: U(W0 + E [~x ] – π – S), with u = benefit, W = certain return, 
π = risk premium, S = sanction.
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if there is a corresponding human rights risk. The 
leverage factor of the probability of occurrence 
would be tantamount to a guarantee, and this 
would result in paying out the above-mentioned 
insurance sum in the case of damage. Risk inten-
sity is the leverage factor that can be regulated 
better internally within the enterprise rather than 
by the state since this is unknown to the state and 
it must therefore resort to a risk premium of its 
own, i. e. a form of tax. Internally the enterprise 
could decouple the human rights decision-making 
process from the financial one: in this way every 
investment decision would be countered with a 
human rights decision from an independent body, 
whereby here the decision-maker’s risk aver-
sity would have to be maximized and the deci-
sion-making competence should not be challenged 
by other decision-makers in the enterprise. The 
design of such an inspection body could also have 
a multi-stakeholder dimension. Redress mecha-
nisms that include this dimension in fact already 
exist, for example the „Independent Expert Panel“ 
that is part of the complaints management division 
of the development funders dEG und FmO.
We should point out that such high expectations 
of self-regulatory processes, which diverge from 
market logic or in some cases even run counter to 
it, raise far-reaching questions about the theory 
of the firm. If business enterprises as a matter 
of principle systematically take decisions of their 
own beyond the business case, i. e. to some extent 
act in a way that runs counter to incentive mecha-
nisms and efficiency conditions, this would imply 
that the purpose and significance of enterprises is 
undergoing a shift. This, too, would have to be the 
subject of a separate analysis.
The present analysis has revealed the conceptual 
contradictions between the human rights and the 
business approaches to risk. In Chapter 2 human 
rights due diligence as stipulated by the uN Guid-
ing Principles was presented. In Chapter 3 the cor-
porate calculation of risk was differentiated from 
the human rights one using markowitz’s modern 
Portfolio Theory. This was illustrated using a case 
example in Chapter 4. The concluding Chapter 5 
used the modern Portfolio Theory as a basis for 
deriving criteria for the state to act in such a way 
that human rights are factored into companies’ 
calculations. 
These criteria are suggestions for how business 
calculations may be taken into account in draw-
ing up political demands and designing human 
rights due diligence concepts. Enterprises that 
wish to integrate human rights into their busi-
ness processes can operationalize these criteria 
internally. Here both enterprises and researchers 
should examine the systemic relationship between 
internal decision-makers and the enterprise. From 
a business point of view, this is a situation with 
far-reaching implications, for it calls into question 
the fundamental understanding of the purpose 
of enterprise: if human rights risk management 
is decoupled from the business case, a “man-
agement paradox” emerges – for example, if the 
enterprise appoints decision-makers who may act 
in a way that runs counter to the (financial and 
image) interests of the enterprise. These are social 
and epistemological questions that will leave 
their mark on our understanding of the concepts 
of “enterprise” and “competition”, and these too 
must also be considered from a human rights 
point of view.
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List of minutes
Date Talks
18 May 2016 minutes of the focus groups talks with communities in Cesar
21 May 2016 minutes of the focus groups talks with communities in La Guajira
22 May 2016 minutes of the talks with Cerrejón in La Guajira
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